In this article, Professor Dolan maintains that UCC Article 5 fashions a comprehensive remedy scheme for recurring damages claims in letter of credit litigation. That scheme, he contends, is upset by the introduction of most common law causes of action in Article 5 litigation. He concludes, therefore, that courts should not entertain those common law claims, which he sees as destructive of letter of credit law and of the unique commercial nature of letters of credit. Using the economic loss doctrine and similar theories, he urges courts to dismiss actions brought in addition to or in lieu of the remedies Article 5 crafts.
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper makes three claims: first, that Article 5 of the Uniform Commercial Code (hereafter "UCC") brings within its remedy section, section 5-111, all contract, tort, and similar causes of action, when the aggrieved party's claim arises out of one or more of the grievances specified in that section' and in the breach of warranty section. 2 Second, that claims against the beneficiary for "wrongful draws" are covered by the warranty section, section 5-110, and are limited to breach of warranty damages. 3 Third, that Article 5 forbids application of most other causes of action extrinsic to Article 5, even though the UCC announces that its rules are supplemented by the common law, including the law, among others, of contract, fraud, and misrepresentation. 4 These three claims rest on the economic loss doctrine, similar theories, and the notion that supplementing UCC remedy provisions with common law claims distorts the general scheme of the various UCC Articles. For simplicity, this paper casts the economic loss doctrine as the chief support for its conclusions.
Part II of this paper explains the causes of action that arise in the letter of credit transaction and that Article 5 contemplates. Part III discusses the economic loss doctrine in order to determine the applicability of the policies it serves in applying the Article 5 remedy and warranty sections. Part IV analyzes the unique nature of letters of credit, the feature of these undertakings that plays a signal role in supporting application of the doctrine in the litigation of these claims. The balance of this paper analyzes the various claims arising out of breach of the duties recognized by Article 5: beneficiary causes of action (Part V), applicant causes of action (Part VI), and issuer and third party causes of action (Part VII).
II. THE ARTICLE 5 CAUSES OF ACTION
The thesis of this paper applies to all letter of credit transactions, simple three-party transactions, multi-party transactions, standby letter of credit transactions, and commercial letter of credit transactions. Because it involves all of the parties, and especially the correspondent bank, the prototypical commercial letter of credit transaction illustrated in the footnote, 5 serves this paper's discussion best.
In the commercial letter of credit transaction, the buyer of goods applies to its bank to open a letter of credit. 6 The buyer's bank usually issues the credit electronically through SWIFT' to its foreign correspondent. 8 The correspondent plays a number of roles. It can simply advise the credit, that is, communicate the terms of the credit to the beneficiary. 9 It might also confirm the credit. By its confirmation, the 5. JOHN 
6.
The "application" in the illustration is an agreement that governs the relationship between the bank's customer and the bank. Importantly, as further discussion explains, the agreement is a contract, generally subject to contract law remedy rules, but with damages limited under the thesis of this paper. Other relationships in the letter of credit transaction are arguably not contracts but "idiosyncratic form[s] of undertaking." U.C.C. correspondent makes the same undertaking that the issuer makes and is liable as an issuer is liable. o Finally, the correspondent might play one of four roles in honoring the letter of credit, the roles of a nominated bank. In these transactions, the issuer nominates the correspondent (1) to pay the beneficiary's draft" or to pay the beneficiary's demand for payment;12 (2) to accept' 3 the beneficiary's time draft,1 4 thereby creating a banker's acceptance; (3) to incur a deferred payment obligation similar to a banker's acceptance but without any negotiable draft; or (4) to negotiate the beneficiary's documents, usually against a draft drawn on the issuer," rather than a draft drawn on the nominated bank. 16 Grievances recognized by Article 5 arise in the following circumstances:
(1) advisor mistake The advisor misadvises the terms of the credit, and the beneficiary suffers loss.' 13. "Accept" as it is used here is a term of art. The party that accepts is an acceptor.
See U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(1) (2002) . A draft that is accepted becomes an "acceptance." See U.C.C. § 3-409(a) (2002).
14. A time draft, sometimes called a "usance" draft, is payable some fixed period of time after a certain date or at some specified future date. Typically, a time draft is payable a certain number of days after sight. For an illustration of a time draft, see DOLAN, TERMS [Vol. 57: 1269
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The issuer, the nominated bank, or the confirmer dishonors without justification, and the beneficiary or the applicant suffers loss.' 8 (3) wrongful honor The issuer, the nominated bank, or the confirmer honors when it should have dishonored, and the wrongful honor damages the applicant. 19 (4) breach of warranty The beneficiary obtains payment under the credit (a) by presenting documents to the issuer, the nominated bank or the confirmer that are materially fraudulent or forged, or (b) when such payment constitutes a breach of the underlying contract that the credit serves, in the illustration, the international sales contract. 2 0 In addition, Article 5 alludes to two causes of action but obviously defers to other law that governs them. Those causes arise when:
(5) post honor default Obligors on bankers' acceptances or deferred payment obligations default.
2 1
(6) improvidently granted injunctions
Obligees on bonds issued under UCC § 5-109(b)(2) suffer loss when applicants or others obtain injunctive relief improvidently.
22
It helps the analysis to examine these failures in the letter of credit transaction under three headings:
(1) beneficiary claims; (2) applicant claims; and (3) issuer and third-party claims.
Yet, before this paper embarks on that analysis, it is necessary to discuss the contours of and policy reason for the economic loss doctrine. That discussion yields a doctrine with somewhat ragged contours and fractured policy footings, yet the investigation supports application of the doctrine in Article 5 litigation. 
III. THE ECONOMIC Loss DOCTRINE AND SIMILAR DOCTRINES

A. In Sale of Goods Transactions
The notion that the economic loss doctrine applies to all economic losses is misleading. Under the doctrine, some losses that are truly economic, as opposed to those that result from tortious behavior, are recoverable; some are not. Professor Nimmer refers to the doctrine as the "so-called 'economic loss doctrine."' 24 In its major sale-of-goods role, the doctrine prevents an aggrieved party from asserting claims in tort for damage to property that the aggrieved party purchased from the defendant. 25 In some cases, the aggrieved party may use tort theories to recover damage to "other property," that is, property other than that purchased, and to recover damage to persons. 26 Neither of those claims, damage to "other property" or damage to persons, are economic under the doctrine, even though such losses are in fact, if not under the doctrine's misuse of the term, economic.
23.
See, e.g., Stanton v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 866 P.2d 15, 18 (Wash. 1993) (defining "economic loss" for purposes of the doctrine as "the cost of replacing and repairing the yachts"); see also The doctrine has found ready application in the sale of goods setting, where courts will deny tort recovery for losses to the "product," the item purchased by the aggrieved party. 27 Those same courts hold generally, however, that losses to other property and to persons occasioned by the "product's" defects are recoverable in tort. 28 The purchaser of a defective grain storage tank cannot use tort causes of action to recover the cost of repairing the tank. The tank is the property, not other property, and the buyer's only remedy is in contract.
29
Not all jurisdictions delimit the doctrine with this distinction between the "property" purchased and other property and personal injury. Purchasers of equipment to milk dairy cows that was itself defective, injured the cows, and caused lost profits could not resort to tort causes of action because Generally speaking, tort principles, such as negligence, are better suited for resolving claims involving unanticipated physical injury, particularly those arising out of an accident. Contract principles, on the other hand, are generally more appropriate for determining claims for consequential damage that the parties have, or could have, addressed in their agreement. The justification for the doctrine in the sale of goods setting rests on the notion that, at the least, in the business-to-business transaction, buyers and sellers can negotiate warranty terms that reflect their perceptions of efficiencies.3 Thus, some courts have said contract law is better suited to deal with allocation of risk of damage to the goods sold. However, that argument does not, in the view of some, justify denial of tort claims for losses to other property or to persons, damages that tort law, especially product liability law, handles better.
32
In the commercial setting, the explanation is convincing.
33
Commercial buyers are in the best position to know whether they want to pay for a warranty, and commercial sellers know whether the price they charge for goods covers the warranty that the buyer seeks. 34 Presumably, a commercial buyer is in a better position than a commercial seller to know whether the buyer should spend time and money on quality assurance that goods it receives from the seller meet the buyer's product tolerances, whether the buyer is better served by relying on the seller's general quality assurance program, or whether the, buyer should pay the seller for additional quality testing.
It is worth mentioning that the varying effects of statutes of limitations often play a critical role in economic loss doctrine cases. Because UCC Article 2 generally allows parties to agree to a one-year statute 35 gist of the action doctrine distinguishes breach of duties arising out of a contractual relationship from torts arising from actions extrinsic to the contract. The former breaches cannot support tort claims, while the latter may.
4 6 The Supreme Court in East River, applying federal admiralty law, used economic loss theory to limit the liability of the seller of goods.
47
Sale of goods transactions are easy candidates for these doctrines. Widespread litigation is far from a free good, and a cause of action is a problematic asset. When the manufacturer of pressure gear for the bicycle industry receives orders from the National Space Administration, quality assurance by NASA is a superior allocation of costs and yields social savings that would be lost if the law unthinkingly imposed quality assurance costs on the manufacturer. In this setting, caveat emptor makes economic sense, while in other settings, it may not. 4 8
B. In Non-Sale of Goods Transactions
Court application of these doctrines to service contracts where Article 2 warranty bargaining theory does not apply is uneven. Many courts are willing to invoke the doctrine in settings where warranty theory is weak.
4 9 Warranty theory is not alone in serving as justification for the economic loss limitations in the sale of goods setting. Some courts justify the doctrine in that setting simply for the reason that the 45 It may not suffice, however, to infer a limitation against tort recovery from a statutory provision for remedies. Unless the legislative regime is expressly preemptive or unless invoking torts rather clearly disturbs the legislative scheme, courts may go too far when they inhibit tort recovery in non-sale settings. When the legislative scheme serves a clear policy of 52 limiting recovery, some courts feel justified in invoking the doctrine.
In non-sale cases, moreover, courts and commentators look for some kind of relationship between the parties that justifies application of liability for negligence. Professor Nimmer's conclusions regarding liability for negligent representation are instructive. He concludes that most courts will enforce tort liability for negligent misrepresentation "only if there is a special relationship with the provider in which the information is intended to influence the recipient's acts." 5 One indication of such intimacy lies in notions of privity, which, as one court has observed, "is not a wholly artificial concept." 54 actions against issuer for wrongful dishonor). (1982) . Actions by letter of credit applicants against confirmers or nominated banks and claims by confirmers and nominated banks against applicants are prime candidates for application of that doctrine if the claims rest on contract law. Yet, the scope of privity is narrow. Its protection against claims does not reach tort claims, the claims this paper argues should not arise in most letter of credit litigation. For authority suggesting that the absence of privity in product liability cases prevents application of the economic loss doctrine, see Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Am. Aviation, Inc., 399 F.3d 1275, 1276 (1lth Cir. 2005). Presumably, the absence of privity prevented the aggrieved party from negotiating loss allocation with the defendant. There being no such opportunity, the economic loss doctrine does not apply.
C. Exceptions for Intentional Torts
Before examining the applicability of the economic loss doctrine to UCC Article 5, it is helpful to examine important limits some courts have fashioned for it. These limits arise out of the breaching party's bad faith, fraud or intentional wrong. While courts apply the doctrine to forbid actions based on negligent performance of duty, 5 negligent misrepresentation, and product or strict liability, 7 there is authority that actions constituting bad faith such as deceit, intentional misrepresentation or common law fraud, survive application of the doctrine. It may be that the doctrine should prohibit even those causes of action, though that argument finds little support in the rationales courts have offered for the doctrine, 9 and the cases are in disarray. Professor Dobbs would not limit such tort claims if the torts are "independent." Arguably, then, fraud in a related transaction would not be subject to the tort, but fraud in the letter of credit transaction itself, say, by the issuer or the beneficiary, would be subject to the doctrine. See Dobbs, supra note 25, at 728. Professor Anzivino notes that some courts have applied the doctrine if the fraud is not "intrinsic to the contract." See Anzivino, supra note 23, at 1096. For authority suggesting a distinction between fraud that is "interwoven" with an undertaking and fraud that is "extraneous" to it, see Christopher J. Farielli we shall see, however, Article 5 suggests that instances of "material" fraud 6 1 give rise to breach of warranty claims and that invoking tort law in the event of beneficiary fraud is not necessary. Article 5 limits liability for fraudulent draws, providing protection to issuers and applicants 62 through the warranty section, and limits the liability of beneficiaries, which are often banks, to actual damages proved.
In the sale of goods setting, one cannot contend that a buyer whose seller has engaged in such intentional misbehavior can properly negotiate warranties. The whole purpose of negotiation is to allocate risks on the basis of honest dealing, which yields efficient allocation of resources. Intentional bad faith, intentional misrepresentation, and common law fraud with its intention feature interfere with proper allocation of resources and should survive application of the economic loss doctrine in the sale of goods setting where courts have invoked warranty theory as the doctrine's predicate.
In situations relying on the presence of a statutory scheme as the predicate, one might move more cautiously in forbidding claims based on these commercially baleful practices. Without clear direction from the statute, the better course is to sustain such claims. There is always the risk, of course, that the trier of fact will misapply the higher proof burdens that the law imposes in these instances, 64 but weaknesses of the trial system are not the subject of this paper, which assumes, perhaps at the risk of Pollyannaism, that judges and jurors follow the law. With respect to the bad faith claims, one must take account of the curious nature of that term. Essentially, "good faith" is an excluder, that is, the absence of "bad faith."
65 Generally, the UCC imposes two requirements for good faith: "[1] honesty in fact and [2] observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing."
66 Under the UCC's general definition, then, bad faith is either dishonesty or failure to observe the standards, both of which are rather more easily discernable than honesty and reasonable observance. UCC Article 5, however, departs from the dual feature good faith definition limiting good faith to honesty in fact alone. 67 Thus, in Article 5, the subject of this paper, the only instance of bad faith is dishonesty.
The distinction obviously narrows the good faith requirement. It also signals legislative concern that reasonableness, the critical ingredient of the second good faith requirement, not be a matter of litigation in Article 5 6 8 -a matter that this paper suggests below informs the scope of the economic loss doctrine's applicability in Article 5.
D. Conclusions Regarding the Doctrine's Policies
This summary does little to resolve the numerous conflicts in application of the doctrine to various settings, and little to fashion the doctrine's limits as a general matter.69 The summary does show, however, that courts use what Professor Dobbs suggests is pragmatism as a rational approach to application of the doctrine. 70 He concludes that "economic harm poses a threat of infinite economic repercussions and that a limit should be imposed by denying the negligence claim where there is real threat of such repercussions. 
"[T]he
not at Article 5 but at the economic loss doctrine as a general principle, urges restraint of one sort or another against a loose tort regime. Analysis of the economic loss doctrine in Article 5 begins with a search for reasons to limit tort in letter of credit transactions. That search yields results that sometimes cut in favor of limits and, at other times, against them, but reading the statute as a whole favors prohibition of torts in the causes of action this paper addresses.
IV. THE UNIQUE NATURE OF THE LETTER OF CREDIT
Letters of credit are not negotiable instruments.
7 4 Nor are they suretyship undertakings. 75 Although courtS 76 and Article 5 itself 77 are sometimes inclined to refer to the letter of credit as a contract, that characterization is also misleading. ) (concluding that courts should approach claims pragmatically, entertaining the claims in some cases, dismissing them in others, with the purpose in all cases of serving three economic policies underpinning the economic loss doctrine: rejecting claims (1) when the loss is personal rather than social; (2) when it is difficult for the defendant to estimate potential losses; and (3) when it is difficult "to delimit the victims"). 
U.C.C. § 5-101 cmt. (2002).
ALI MALEK QC & DAVID QUEST, JACK: DOCUMENTARY CREDITS § 5.1 (4th ed.
2009) (the leading U.K. treatise characterizing letter of credit as "binding contract").
pre-code scholars treated the letter of credit as a "commercial specialty" akin to a sealed instrument. 80 We know, however, that letters of credit need no consideration to be binding. 8 ' They come into existence without the parties' observance of the offer-and-acceptance paradigm of contract formation, 82 and must be in the form of a "record."
8 3 Letters of credit may not be issued by individuals for "personal, family, or household purposes,"8 and are irrevocable even though silent on revocability and even though there is no reliance on them. Finally, they can give rise to an important and strict estoppel against their issuers, that is, a preclusion that arises without any showing of detriment or reliance. 86 Letters of credit, moreover, are generally subject to the formalism that contract law has eschewed. They terminate on their stated expiry without regard to any beneficiary excuse for tardiness 87 and are generally subject to the perfecttender rule that contract law long ago jettisoned. Most of the time, letters of credit are subject to international rules formulated especially for them by a trade association, the International Chamber of Commerce. 8 9 A subset of them, the standby letter of credit, is the subject of a United Nations Convention. 89. See U.C.P. 600, supra note 9.
See 1995-United Nations Convention on Independent Guarantees and Stand-By Letters
of Credit, UNCITRAL, issue such undertakings, the form of their obligation and their practices are subject to special bank regulations fashioned for letters of credit.91
The critical point of all this is that letters of credit are unique commercial devices, not negotiable instruments, not suretyship undertakings, and not contracts. Except to the extent precedent discloses the policies that the economic loss doctrine serves, the decision whether to apply .the economic loss doctrine in letter of credit cases rests on the nature of the credit undertaking and not on precedent dealing with contracts or other obligations. As this discussion of the doctrine's history and application discloses, courts have fashioned the doctrine not so much as positive law but rather as a prerogative that permits them to apply it selectively. Whether the nature of letters of credit supports selective application or universal application is the question this paper addresses next.
V. BENEFICIARY CAUSES OF ACTION
A. For Wrongful Dishonor
When the letter of credit issuer dishonors the beneficiary's complying presentation, the beneficiary may face three kinds of loss: (1) loss of the funds that the issuer should have paid; (2) consequential damages; and (3) in commercial letter of credit transactions, incidental expenses incurred salvaging goods that may be in transit or rotting on a dock. 92 In the commercial letter of credit transaction, however, the beneficiary may be able to recoup all or part of its loss by reselling the goods to a third party. The Article 5 remedy provision addresses in subsection (a) each of those losses and the possibility that the beneficiary might chose to mitigate its damages. 93 Significantly, section 5-111(a) measures the pecuniary loss by the amount of the beneficiary's draw on the credit without requiring the beneficiary to mitigate. 94 The disappointed beneficiary, then, may let the goods rot and still recover in 
Id.
Id
full, plus interest on the unpaid amount. 9 5 The beneficiary may also recover incidental damages and attorney's fees, if they are incurred.
6
The beneficiary may not recover consequential damages, however. 9
The pattern is instructive. It reveals as the legislature's purposes: (1) by creating a per se damages rule in the amount of the beneficiary's dishonored draft, a policy of creating disincentives for the issuer to dishonor; 98 and (2) by fashioning the per se damages rule and by prohibiting recovery of consequential damages a policy of fostering certainty in wrongful dishonor litigation. The official comments assert that given the prohibition of consequential damages " [a] fortiori punitive and exemplary damages are excluded."
99 Consequential damages and punitive damages, of course, are notoriously difficult to estimate ex ante. The remedy section mandates attorney's fees, perhaps as a surrogate for punitive damages, but one that is less difficult to estimate. 00 In short, this complex set of rules reflects the same policy limitations that the economic loss doctrine serves.
Application of tort liability, of course, upsets the certainty feature, opens the damages in a way that renders them impossible for the issuer to estimate, and creates an imbalance in the Article's remedy rules. It also renders problematic banks' compliance with regulations that order banks to issue letters of credit only if their liability is restricted to an 
U.C.C. § 5-11 (e) (2002
B. Wrongful Advice
The letter of credit industry has taken steps to reduce the incidence of mistake in advices. SWIFT' permits banks to communicate electronically, and most bank advisors send the beneficiary a printed copy of the electronic credit it receives from the opening bank or the electronic copy itself. It is not unusual for the applicant's data entry clerks, using electronic data interchange, to send data to the issuer, whose entry clerks enter it wholesale into the issuer's software and cause the credit to issue to the advisor in electronic format. Finally, SWIFT limits membership and polices its program with various algorithms, software, and other safety devices that render the identity of senders and advisors reliable and virtually error free-a vast improvement over devices the industry used in former times (teletype machines that ran out of paper or bank signature records that required bankers to act as handwriting experts comparing signatures on letters of credit)."' 7 An advisor's duty to the beneficiary and to the issuer is to render the advice accurately and to the beneficiary to check the apparent authenticity of the issuer. SWIFT renders the risk of error in either case minimal.
Nonetheless, there can be mistakes." Yet, mistakes other than those mentioned are not actionable. If, then, an advisor does not advise in timely fashion, so that the beneficiary does not receive the advice in time to draw on it, the advisor is not liable.' 9 One might argue simply that the advisor has no duty to advise in timely fashion or that there is no privity between the advisor and the beneficiary. The more convincing answer to advisor non-liability in this setting and others outside the scope of the duties imposed by Article 5 is that the beneficiary is in the better position to know the consequences of the tardiness or mistake. In the unlikely event that an advisor issues a credit with terms or conditions that vary the terms of the underlying contract, the beneficiary will know of the mistakes, but the advisor, a stranger to that underlying contract will not. Similarly, if advice is late, the beneficiary can take steps to protect itself. It should not ship goods before it receives the advice. If the advice does not arrive, it must notify the applicant, and ask whether the credit has been issued. If the terms of the advice vary from the terms of the underlying contract, the beneficiary should obtain an amendment before shipping the goods. Manufacturers should not begin the manufacture of specialty goods before they know there is a credit in place on which they can draw. In these cases, the beneficiary knows the critical facts. The advisor does not. To impose liability on the advisor for these mistakes flies in the face of the economic loss doctrine's policies.
The possibility of loss to the beneficiary, moreover, from breach of the advisor's duties under the UCP is unlikely; but losses, if they do arise out of such breach, should fall on the advisor. The advisor can check the apparent authenticity of the request from the issuer or can take steps to ensure that it transmits the advice accurately. The beneficiary, however, is in the superior position to know facts and to guard against other mistakes.
Article 5 does not address the issue of damages in the event of advisor breach.1 20 The certainty concerns are evident in the issuer liability rules for wrongful dishonor come into play here. Arguably, it is more consistent with the policy evident in the remedy section and with the economic loss doctrine to make the advisor liable for the full amount of the beneficiary's loss when the issuer dishonors because of the advisor's mistake. One could use contract damages rules by analogy and force the beneficiary to prove its losses by a preponderance of the evidence. That approach guarantees litigation with its attendant costs to both parties. A per se rule similar to that of section 5-111(a) is the better answer. The beneficiary's losses here are economic. The per se rule permits the advisor to estimate its risks. Under a per se rule, damages are not speculative or difficult to prove, and the beneficiary alone, not its suppliers, employees, or anyone else can recover.121 The duties run to the beneficiary alone.
VI. APPLICANT CAUSES OF ACTION
A. For Wrongful Dishonor
When the issuer dishonors wrongfully, it is not only the beneficiary that incurs losses. The applicant may also incur them. The issuer's dishonor may render the applicant in breach of the underlying contract. [Vol. 57: 1269
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The "underlying contract" in a commercial letter of credit is, as the illustration in note five supra indicates,' 22 a contract for the sale of goods. If that contract specifies "payment by letter of credit," the issuer's dishonor of the beneficiary's complying presentation renders the applicant, the buyer of the goods, liable for the sales price. 123 In a standby credit transaction, payment under the credit may well be an interest or principal payment on a bond or similar obligation. In both cases, the applicant may incur damages-loss of goods for which it must cover in the commercial transaction and acceleration of principal indebtedness in the standby transaction. Both can lead to consequential damages-damage to reputation in an industry in the commercial transaction with attendant refusal of suppliers to deal and embarrassment or insolvency in the standby transaction.
The Article 5 remedy section stipulates that such a damaged applicant may recover his damages, including incidental damages, less expenses saved as a consequence of the breach, but not consequential damages.124 The breach, of course, is not a breach of the letter of credit but of the application agreement-a garden variety contract. Thus the Article 5 rule is puzzling, for, apart from the fee that the applicant paid the issuer for issuing the credit, consequential damages are really the only damages the applicant will incur.1 25 The issuer will not debit the applicant's account. There will be no payment under the credit and no corresponding reimbursement obligation. Any fee that the applicant has paid to the issuer ought to be returned, but that fee will almost always be small relative to the applicant's consequential losses. The official comments to the remedies section are unhelpful, and the measure of the applicant's non-consequential damages remains obscure.1 2 6
It is not obscure, however, that under Article 5 the applicant should not recover consequential damages.1 2 7 If a standby credit applicant uses a standby to make direct payments on a bond, the applicant may sustain serious consequential damages when the issuer dishonors the standby wrongfully. The applicant may lose financially attractive credit terms under the bond. It may have to refinance at higher rates and may incur penalties, attorney's fees and other expenses due the bondholder. In those circumstances, however, though the applicant may, under section 5- 
111(b)
recover the fee it paid the issuer, it may not recover the serious consequential damages.
Application of tort causes of action, for negligent evaluation of the beneficiary's documents, say, would relieve the harshness of that rule. Yet application of tort law here violates the Article 5 policy of protecting financial institutions from liability for the unlimited damages that tort law countenances. Pre-Article 5 commentary, government regulations, and case law make it abundantly clear that the policy against imposing consequential damages on banks is not the product of legislative indifference or oversight.1 2 8 Clearly, the applicant's losses are economic, and application of the economic loss doctrine is in order.
Applicant efforts to recover loss when the issuer wrongfully dishonors have had limited success. Notwithstanding the clear implication in section 5-111(b) that applicants may sue for wrongful dishonor, reported cases involving applicant claims for damages occasioned by wrongful dishonor are rare. Given the fact that the applicant is not a party to the letter of credit, courts appear to be disinclined to sustain such causes of action.1 29
B. For Wrongful Honor
While applicant claims for wrongful dishonor are not evident in the cases, applicant claims for wrongful honor arise. These cases, also sanctioned by Article 5,130 eschew any per se rule, however, that would allow the applicant to recover the amount of the draw per se. Instead they force the applicant to prove that the issuer's mistaken payment causes the 128. "If the banks were liable for consequential damages, the added liability would have to be directly reflected in commercial credit rates, with the result that the skillful and prudent members of the mercantile community would be paying, through increased rates, for the ineptitude or recklessness of marginal operators." HENRY HARFIELD, BANK CREDITS AND ACCEPTANCES 109 (5th ed. 1974). There is no hint in the pre-code cases that anything other than the face amount of the credit plus interest are recoverable. See generally NEW YORK LAW REVISION COMM'N, STUDY OF UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, ARTICLE 5-LETTERS OF CREDIT 131-37 (1955). The face-amount rule, moreover, has no application in the wrongful dishonor setting, for the applicant has not lost that amount, which should remain in its deposit account, the issuer not having paid the beneficiary. applicant loss.' 3 ' Applicants might resort to breach of the application agreement, a breach of contract action rather than the statutory cause of action in section 5-111(b), yet for courts to countenance that breach of contract cause of action with its possibility of consequential damages clearly violates the plain intention of Article 5 to deny the applicant recovery of consequential damages. 132 This disparate treatment, (1) a per se rule for beneficiary claims against issuers for wrongful dishonor and (2) a "damages proved" rule for applicant claims for wrongful honor or wrongful dishonor, is consistent with the fact that the former are claims for breach of the letter of credit undertaking, while the latter are claims for breach of contract, the application agreement. But, the disparate treatment is inconsistent with the fact that the issuer is in no better position to foresee damages in one over the other. Nonetheless, for the purposes of measuring the fit of the economic loss doctrine in these transactions, both rules support its application. The per se rule reflects legislative concern that damages not be unlimited and that litigation over them not be protracted. It is a simple rule, easy to determine and easy to apply.
The per se rule, though inexact in measuring the beneficiary's actual damages, allows easy determination of a figure that approximates the damages the beneficiary suffers. There is no amount in the letter of credit transaction that approximates the applicant's losses, however, so a per se rule for applicant claims for wrongful dishonor cannot supply a valid damages measure. The "damages proved" rule is a breach of contract damages rule. As a typical contract damages remedy, it applies without regard for negligence or bad faith; furthermore, it does not allow recovery of exemplary damages, 1 and the losses it covers are economic losses. In short, the stated Article 5 remedies for applicant recovery for breach of the application agreement are purely economic.
13 4 Article 5 limits damages in the same way that the doctrine limits them. There is no statutory justification, then, to supplement the Article 5 remedies with tort remedies.
C. For Breach of Warranty
Applicants complain when the beneficiaries' draws on the issuer are fraudulent, include forged documents, or constitute a breach of the underlying contract between the applicant and the beneficiary.' 3 Thus, when a beneficiary presents a forged bill of lading; a seriously false, i.e., fraudulent,136 inspection certificate; or draws for amounts in exces's of those due under the contract between the beneficiary and the applicant, the applicant is necessarily damaged and merits a cause of action against the beneficiary for losses occasioned by the issuer's payment against such draws. Although applicants often style these actions in any variety of ways, these complaints sound in warranty. Section 5-110 creates such warranties when the issuer pays the beneficiary in such cases. Regrettably, disappointed applicants, for whatever reasons, are inclined to fashion causes of action other than the warranty causes, resorting instead to actions in third-party-contract-beneficiary theory, acknowledge, without apology, that sometimes a beneficiary's breach of this warranty will yield damages of "zero."
The references to other articles are helpful. Article 2, the UCC's Sales article, was the locus for development of the economic loss doctrine. Generally, the economic loss doctrine denies recovery of such damages unless they are foreseeable.' 4 6 The warranty sections in Articles 3 and 4, moreover, limit recovery for breach of warranty to actual loss suffered, not to exceed the amount of the item, plus expenses and interest.1 4 7 In short, the warranties of the referenced articles are consistent with application of the economic loss doctrine in Article 5 warranty litigation. They either adopt the doctrine or fashion loss limits that reflect the policies of the doctrine identified in Part III above: keeping loss recovery to damages that are foreseeable. . 2011) , the court ruled that an action on an improperly dishonored check is a suit for breach of a contract and, therefore, that attorney's fees were recoverable even though Article 3 does not provide for such recovery. In Atria Builders, 922 N.Y.S.2d 364, the court held that an action by an applicant against the beneficiary for wrongful dishonor of a letter of credit was an action in contract subject to contract remedies even though the applicant was not in privity with the beneficiary. To characterize that action as one for breach of the Article 5 warranty is surely superior analysis. See authority cited infra note 148.
148. The term "applicant" includes not just the buyer in the illustration set out in note 5 supra, but also parties that arrange the letter of credit for the buyer. See U.C.C. parties make their appearance. They are (1) banks other than the issuer or confirmer and (2) investors, a term that may include banks, all of whom take an interest in obligations that arise post-issuance. Parts V and VI address beneficiary and applicant remedies respectively. This Part deals with issuer claims and those of parties who appear in the transaction after the credit issues.
A. Banks in Their Various Letter of Credit Transaction Roles
The letter of credit issuer is almost always a bank. 5 0 Issuers file claims against their customers when the customers breach the application agreement, usually by failing to reimburse the issuer post-payment or by failing to provide collateral or funds pre-payment if the application agreement so provides. These claims rest on contract law, are for economic losses, and fit neatly into the economic loss doctrine, just as the applicant's claims against the issuer, discussed in Part VI above, fit into it. In any event, they are beyond the scope of this paper, which addresses letter of credit transaction claims, not breach of contract claims.
The letter of credit issuer does make claims that arise out of the letter of credit relationships. Those claims are for breach of the letter of credit warranties described in section 5-110 of the UCC. Regrettably, cases involving these claims may miscast them as suits for "wrongful draw," action brought by an applicant against the beneficiary with whom the applicant was not in privity).
149. It is possible, though rare, for letter of credit transactions to involve only two parties. An issuer may cause a letter of credit to issue to itself as beneficiary. See, e.g., 150. Non-banks may issue letters of credit, but many that do are financial institutions. Occasionally, a beneficiary will take a credit issued by an industrial firm, mortgage broker, or the like, which issues the credit for its own account, sometimes with predictable and untoward results. See Gulf Bank KSC v. Mitsubishi Heavy Indus., Ltd. breach of contract, replevin, conversion, and unjust enrichment, '" 5 ' all the while ignoring the fact that the beneficiary's conduct breaches the Article 5 warranties due the issuer.
152 A more rational approach would limit claims to breach of warranty by dismissing these various non-Article 5 claims. A fortiori, courts should also dismiss tort claims with the exception of those claims that involve material fraud, or other intentional and dishonest conduct.
There is authority that the economic loss doctrine does not displace actions for fraud and intentional misrepresentation. Fraud is a problem no less in letter of credit transactions than in other commercial activity, and it has caught the attention of courts and legislators, who have fashioned law over more than sixty years to deal with it. Often, applicants do not want the issuer to pay the beneficiary, and they sometimes claim the beneficiary's demand for payment is fraudulent. If the court entertains that defense by investigating the facts, it will delay payment of the credit pending the outcome of the litigation that investigation entails. Delay in payment destroys the credit, however, for it forces the beneficiary to litigate before it is paid and transmutes the letter of credit (a pay-now, argue-later device) into a bond (an arguenow, pay-later-device).1 54 In virtue of that threat, courts and the UCC have fashioned limits on the fraud defense. Chief among them, and the limit pertinent to this discussion, is the feature of letter of credit law that limits fraud defenses to those that are what the UCC calls "letter of credit" fraud.
The leading case is from a New York trial court, which held that courts cannot ignore fraud even though fraud claims pose serious threats 153. Letter of credit law treats claims of forgery in one of the documents the beneficiary presents in the same way that it treats the fraud defense. If reported cases are any indication, however, applicants seldom raise the forgery defense.
154. See Eakin v. Cont'l Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 875 F.2d 114, 116 (7th Cir. 1989) (characterizing the credit as a pay-now, argue-later device in contrast to an argue-now, pay-later device).
imposing serious procedural burdens on issuers or applicants seeking to invoke it,1 5 9 and by creating a cadre of protected parties against whom it is no defense.
16 0
This brief summary of the fraud defense sheds light on the subject of fraud claims. Fraud litigation before the issuer honors the credit is anathema to the proper functioning of letters of credit as commercial devices; hence the legislative and judicial resistance to such defenses except in the narrowest of situations. Clearly, fraud claims should arise only after the issuer honors the credit, else the issuer could raise its fraud claim by way of counterclaim and effectively avoid the tethers Article 5 has fashioned to prevent pre-honor litigation of the fraud issue.
Article 5 recognizes post-honor fraud claims.161 In fact, it codifies a rule for them in the warranty section, which recognizes fraud as a warranty breach. 162 Article 5 limits damages for such claims to contract nature damages and acknowledges that sometimes the damages will be less that the amount of the credit and sometimes zero. 16 3 It is difficult to conceive of clearer evidence that the legislature does not want fraud claims to include recovery of damages in tort, including exemplary damages. What is more, the policy of the warranty section which includes limitations for fraud claims is also evidence of an intention that parties not be able to avoid easily the limitations on fraud claims by styling the claims as bad faith, deceit, intentional misrepresentation, or the like.
In short, this intentional misbehavior by a beneficiary breaches the warranty. The breach of warranty cause of action should displace the issuer's common law tort actions against the beneficiary in letter of credit litigation. 
